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Abstract 
Macroeconomic models currently used by policy makers generally assume that the 
workings of financial markets can be fully summarised by financial prices, because the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds. This paper argues that these models are too 
limited in describing how monetary policy (and other) shocks are transmitted to the 
economy and points to new directions. The models are too limited because they disregard 
an information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and the importance of financial 
intermediaries not only for individual depositors but the economy as a whole. 
Incorporating financial market interactions into macroeconomic models will enhance the 
understanding of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy and other shocks.  
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Asymmetric Information,  
Financial Intermediation and  
the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism: A Critical Review 
1 Introduction 
To conduct monetary and fiscal policies successfully, policy makers must have an 
accurate assessment of the timing and effects of their policies on the economy. This 
includes an understanding of the monetary transmission mechanisms through which 
monetary policy affects the decisions of firms, households, financial intermediaries and 
investors that alter the level of economic activity and prices. This paper argues that 
macroeconomic models currently used by policy makers are too limited in describing the 
transmission mechanisms and points to new directions. 
Interest and exchange rates are the prototypical channels through which monetary policy 
affects the economy in contemporary models used by policy makers.
1 The assumption in 
these models is that the workings of financial markets can be fully summarized by 
financial prices, because the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds.  
Under the assumptions that financial markets are complete and information and 
transaction costs are non-existent, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem states that 
the mix of debt and equity used to finance firms￿ expenditures does not affect the 
expected profitability of the project ￿ the same investment decisions would be made, 
irrespective of the mix of debt and equity finance. Fama￿s (1980) extension of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem to the entire financial system allows the abstraction from 
considerations of credit market conditions in macroeconomic models.  
While the complete market assumption remains important in economics, the assumption 
of zero information and transaction costs (or perfect information) has come under 
increasing criticism since Akerlof￿s (1970) seminal paper, which illustrated how imperfect 
information between buyers and sellers can cause market malfunctioning. With imperfect 
information, the market price reflects buyers￿ perception of the average quality of the 
                                                                 
1   See, for example, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand￿s Forecasting and Policy System (Black, Cassino, Drew, Hansen, Hunt, Rose 
and Scott, 1997), the New Zealand Treasury NZTM model (Szeto, 2002), the Federal Reserve Board of Governors￿ FRB/US 
model (Brayton and Tinsley, 1996), the International Monetary Fund￿s MULTIMOD model for industrial countries (Laxton, Isard, 
Faruqee, Prasad and Turtelboom, 1998), the Bank of Canada￿s Quarterly Projection Model (Black, Laxton, Rose and Tetlow, 
1994) or the Australian Treasury￿s TRYM model (Commonwealth Treasury 1996a, 1996b).  
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product being sold, and sellers of low quality products will receive a premium at the 
expense of those selling high quality goods. As a result, some high quality sellers will stay 
out of the market, which will lower the average quality of the product and price of the 
product even further, leading more high quality sellers to stay out of the market. The 
process will continue and may preclude the market from actually opening. Efficient 
markets require some mechanisms for overcoming the imperfect information problem.  
In financial markets, an information asymmetry arises between borrowers and lenders 
because borrowers generally know more about their investment projects than lenders do. 
Intermediaries, which specialise in collecting information, evaluating projects and 
borrowers, and monitoring borrowers￿ performance, can help overcome the information 
problem. Financial intermediaries thus exist because there are information and 
transactions costs that arise from imperfect information between borrowers and lenders. 
This implies that the assumptions upon which the Modigliani-Miller theorem is based, and 
thus the macroeconomic models used by policy makers, do not hold. Conditions in 
financial and credit markets can affect the real economy; and interest and exchange rates 
are an incomplete description of the monetary transmission mechanism.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds in six further sections. Section 2 describes the 
standard interest and exchange rate channels of the monetary transmission mechanism 
as they are typically incorporated in macroeconmic models. These channels are too 
limited as they abstract from credit market interactions. The idea that the credit creation 
process can have real economic effects is not new and section 3 reviews traditional 
theories of the role of credit markets including Wicksell￿s early writings on monetary 
dynamics and Fisher￿s (1933) ￿debt-deflation theory of great depressions￿. Current 
theories are discussed in section 4 and the credit channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism as it is currently characterised in the literature is described in section 5. A 
number of dynamic general equilibrium models that account for an explicit role of credit 
market frictions in business cycle fluctuations have been developed recently. These are 
discussed in section 6. None of the models is complete and section 7 summarises and 
concludes with a brief assessment of avenues for future research.  
2  Interest and exchange rate channels
2 
A central bank derives the power to influence wholesale money market interest rates from 
the fact that it is the monopoly supplier of high-powered money (also known as outside 
money or the monetary base). Although the institutional details differ from country to 
country, the operating procedure of central banks is generally similar. Central banks 
choose the price at which they lend high-powered money to the inter-bank market. The 
quantitative effect of a change in the official central bank lending rate on other interest 
rates, and on financial market conditions more generally, depends on the extent to which 
a policy change is anticipated, how the change affects expectations of future policy, 
interest rates and inflation, and the degree of nominal price rigidities.  
Real (inflation expectations adjusted) interest rates reflect the opportunity cost of current 
expenditure relative to expenditure in some future period, since earning a return in the 
interim enables greater consumption or investment at a later date. Changes in real 
interest rates alter the incentives to consume and invest in the present versus consuming 
and investing in future.  
                                                                 
2   The channels described in this section reflect those typically incorporated in macroeconomic models of the type listed in footnote 1. 
Specific references to these and other sources are therefore not noted separately in the discussion that follows.  
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Movements in short-term interest rates affect longer-term interest rates, at which financial 
institutions typically lend to and borrow from businesses and consumers, as illustrated by 
the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. The expectations 
hypothesis states that, for any choice of holding period, the expected return is the same 
for any combination of bonds of different maturities. For example, the rate of return from 
holding a one-year note should be the same as holding two successive six-month notes.
3  
Real interest rates more closely reflect the costs and benefits of deferring expenditure 
than nominal interest rates as they account for the loss of purchasing power due to 
inflation. The link between nominal rates, set by the central bank and financial 
intermediaries, and real interest rates is through the Fisher equation. The Fisher equation 
decomposes the observed nominal interest rate into an expected inflation component and 
an expected real rate and can be written as  
1( 1 ) ( 1 )

 ,+ ,+ ,+  += + ⋅ + Π tt k tt k t tt k ir E   (1) 
where all values are in discrete time,  ,+ tt k i  denotes the nominal rate of return on lending 
(or the cost of borrowing) from time t  to time  + tk ,  ,+ tt k r  is the ex ante real lending 
(borrowing) rate from time t  to time  + tk  and 
 
  ,+   Π tt t k E  refers to the expected rate at time 
t  of inflation between time t  and  + tk .
4  
An increase in short-term nominal interest rates will lead to higher short-term ex ante real 
rates if inflation expectations do not adjust upwards by the full increase in short-term 
interest rates and will result in higher short-term ex post real rates if there is price 
stickiness.
5 Inflation inertia and price stickiness can arise from slow adjustment of 
expectations, the existence of explicit or implicit contracts that are not indexed to the rate 
of inflation, menu costs of adjusting prices, real rigidities, and price and wage staggering.  
Higher real rates directly reduce the profitability of investment projects because of higher 
financing costs, and indirectly because of the prospect of a slowdown in consumption. A 
rise in interest rates tends to encourage households to reduce current consumption 
because the return on saving and the cost of borrowing to finance consumption both 
increase. Monetary policy may have an additional effect on current consumption by 
lowering the disposable income of households who are borrowers. A portion of 
households￿ spending is on servicing debt interest. Increases (decreases) in interest rates 
will raise (lower) the amount of debt servicing required and lower (increase) disposable 
income. The opposite holds true for households who are savers and the overall net effect 
on consumption will depend on how much the change in consumption of borrowers is 
offset by that of savers.
6
 
In an open economy, monetary policy also affects output and inflation through the 
influence that interest rates have on the exchange rate. Interest parity arguments imply 
that movements in domestic interest rates will induce movements in the exchange rate. 
Uncovered interest parity, for example, states that the expected return on a bond 
                                                                 
3   Uncertainty regarding future short-term interest rates coupled with risk aversion may cause the term structure to deviate from the 
shape implied by the risk-neutral expectations hypothesis. This deviation is captured by a term premium. 
4   This formulation of the Fisher equation abstracts from taxes and, as Svensson (1985) notes, the simple Fisher relation does not 
hold under uncertainty. 
5   It is not frequently recognised that an increase in short-term nominal interest rates will, ceteris paribus, have a neutral effect on the 
real economy only if prices adjust downwards in a stepwise manner, enabling subsequent price inflation to occur over the period 
relevant to that interest rate. 
6   In the case of fixed term interest rates, changes in interest rates will affect consumption if households believe that they eventually 
will have to face the new interest rate and alter their consumption behaviour in anticipation.  
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denominated in a foreign currency should be the same as the expected return from 
holding an otherwise identical domestic currency bond. A differential between domestic 
and foreign interest rates reflects expected movements in the exchange rate. A change in 
monetary policy that leads to movements in the differential between domestic and foreign 
interest rates therefore implies (assuming uncovered interest rate parity) that either the 
exchange rate or the expected exchange rate or both must change.  
Exchange rate movements have a direct impact on the cost of imports and domestic 
inflation.
7 Exchange rate movements also have an indirect impact on inflation through 
their impact on the demand and supply of tradeable and non-tradeable goods and 
services. An appreciation of the exchange rate, for example, will lower the rate of growth 
of the domestic price level, which is a weighted average of tradeables and non-tradeables 
prices. This is because an appreciation of the exchange rate decreases the domestic 
price of tradeables (if tradeables prices are determined in foreign currency units by world 
markets). A decrease in the price of tradeables relative to non-tradeables increases the 
domestic demand for tradeables (and lowers the domestic supply of tradeable goods and 
services).
8 Moreover, an appreciation of the exchange rate (or decline in the relative price 
of tradeables to non-tradeables) reduces the domestic demand for non-tradeables and 
increases the domestic supply of non-tradeables, causing excess supply of non-
tradeables and a reduction in the price of non-tradeables.  
Monetary policy affects asset prices more generally. For example, monetary policy directly 
affects the market value of future cash flows through its effect on the discount factor. The 
relationship between the market price of a unit future cash flow and interest rates is  
exp( ) ,+ =− ⋅ tt k t t PV i k   (2) 
where  ,+ tt k PV  is the present value at time t  of a cash flow that matures at time  + tk ,  t i  
denotes the continuously compounding interest rate at annual rates at time t  and  t k  is 
the number of years to maturity at time t . The present value (or market price) of the cash 
flow is inversely related to the yield, i.e. a rise in  t i  lowers the present value of the cash 
flow and a decline in  t i  raises it. This result generalises to all assets (bonds, equities, 
property, etc.) because the value of all assets can be defined as a combination of 
expected future cash flows.  
Tobin￿s  q theory provides a mechanism through which monetary policy affects the 
economy through its effects on the valuation of equities. Tobin (1969) defines q as the 
market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. The market price of firms 
will increase with an easing in monetary policy. Tobin￿s q rises if this market price of firms 
increases relative to the replacement cost of capital, i.e. if the cost of new plant and 
equipment capital declines relative to the market value of firms. Investment spending will 
rise because firms can purchase new investment goods, which will be valued in the equity 
market at greater than their purchase cost.
9
  
On the other hand, when q is low, firms will not purchase new investment goods because 
the market value of firms is low relative to the cost of capital. If companies want to acquire 
capital when q is low, they can buy another firm cheaply and acquire old capital instead. 
As a result, investment spending will be low.  
                                                                 
7   See, for example, Adolfson (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2002). 
8   The increase in demand for tradeables is reflected in a deterioration in the current account deficit of the balance of payments 
(matched by a rise in the net foreign demand for domestic assets). 
9   Here we are referring to marginal q rather than average q since it is the valuation of the marginal investment project which is 
relevant (Hayashi, 1982).  
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Consumption spending will also be affected by changes in the market value of equities. 
This is because equities are typically a component of households￿ financial wealth. When 
equities and stock prices fall, because of a tightening in monetary policy, the value of 
financial wealth decreases, leading to a decline in household consumption. This is 
because households￿ consumption spending is determined by their lifetime resources, 
which consist of current and future human capital, real capital and financial wealth. A 
tightening in monetary policy that leads to a decline in land and property values or 
structures and residential housing values also causes households￿ wealth to decline, while 
lower interest rates cause an increase in financial wealth.  
Interest and exchange rates and asset prices are important channels through which 
monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation. All, or most of these channels are 
typically incorporated in macroeconomic models and can operate in conjunction with 
various degrees of price stickiness. However, in the presence of imperfect information, 
financial prices are unlikely to be a complete description of the monetary transmission 
mechanism for the reasons outlined in the introduction. Macroeconomic models that rely 
solely on the traditional price channels as conduits of monetary policy are likely to omit 
key channels through which monetary policy can affect activity and inflation. The 
remainder of this paper examines the role of financial intermediaries and credit in 
establishing additional channels of monetary policy influence on the real and nominal 
economy.  
3  Traditional literature on financial 
intermediation 
The credit creation process is ￿the process by which, in exchange for paper claims, the 
savings of specific individuals or firms are made available for the use of other individuals 
or firms￿ (Bernanke, 1992-93, p. 50). The idea that the credit creation process can have 
real economic effects is not new. The role of bank lending in the propagation of cyclical 
fluctuations has been examined since at least Wicksell￿s early writings on monetary 
dynamics and Fisher￿s ￿debt-deflation theory of great depressions￿.  
Wicksell￿s theory focuses on the tendency for bank lending and the money supply to 
expand during periods of boom and strong demand for loanable funds. To explain these 
credit expansions during booms, Wicksell introduces the concept of the ￿natural rate of 
interest￿. The natural rate is defined as the ￿rate of interest at which the demand for loan 
capital and the supply of savings exactly agree￿ (Wicksell, 1906, p. 193). It is determined 
by the demand for loans, which depends on the expected profitability of investment.  
The trouble as Wicksell saw it was that the market rate of interest tends to be sticky, 
responding only slowly and with a delay to changes in the demand for funds. Because of 
this stickiness, if the natural rate rises, because of changes in domestic or foreign 
demand, the market interest rate will be below the natural rate for some time, increasing 
the demand for loans (and lowering the supply of saving).
10 The increase in borrowing and 
investment in turn raises spending and prices, leading to higher expected profitability of 
investment, further investment, spending and increased prices. This ￿cumulative￿ process 
continues until banks raise market interest rates (when running out of excess reserves).  
                                                                 
10   Investment, which equaled saving before the opening of the gap between the natural and market rates, now exceeds saving.  
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Fisher (1933), who examined the Great Depression, argues that economic crises result 
from ￿over-indebtedness￿ and can be exacerbated by falling prices. The ￿great cause of 
over-borrowing￿ is ￿easy money￿ (Fisher, 1933, p. 348).  
During the 1920s, households and unincorporated businesses had greatly increased their 
levels of debt and, in Fisher￿s view, the high leverage of borrowers was the prime cause of 
over-indebtedness. Over-indebtedness in turn led to ￿over-production￿ (or excess supply) 
and prices fell to restore equilibrium ￿ a period of over-production (excess supply) was 
followed by a period of under-production (excess demand), causing large cyclical 
fluctuations in output.  
The  direct effect of the business downturn that led to the Great Depression was an 
increase in bankruptcies, which still further contributed to the slowing of the economy. The 
indirect impact, and possibly the more important channel in the propagation mechanism, 
was the price deflation caused by the downturn. Given that debt contracts were written in 
nominal terms, the protracted fall in prices and money incomes greatly increased real debt 
burdens. The deterioration in borrowers￿ net worth due to higher debt induced borrowers 
to reduce spending, sending the economy into further decline, and thus continuing the 
spiral of falling output and deflation.
11  
In Wicksell￿s and Fisher￿s view, business cycles are caused by the expansion and 
contraction of credit. In Keynes￿ (1936) General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, the financial variable most relevant to aggregate economic activity is money rather 
than credit. The financial system plays a less explicit role in Keynes￿ theory of output 
determination, although credit market conditions are important for investment behaviour. A 
key factor in the determination of investment is the ￿state of confidence￿ and Keynes 
(1936) distinguishes two basic determinants of this state. The first is the borrowers￿ beliefs 
about ￿prospective yields￿ from investment projects. The second is the ￿state of credit￿, 
which is determined by the confidence lenders have in financing borrowers. A collapse in 
confidence of either borrowers or lenders is sufficient to induce a downturn.  
The macroeconomics literature following the General Theory largely ignored any links 
between movements in output and credit market conditions (Gertler, 1988). Some 
attention was redirected toward the interaction between financial structure and real activity 
with Gurley and Shaw (1955), who emphasised the role of financial intermediaries in 
improving the efficiency of intertemporal trade and economic growth. Their argument is 
based on an observed correlation between economic development and the system of 
financial intermediation.
12 In developed countries there generally exists a highly organised 
and broad system of financial intermediation to facilitate the flow of loanable funds 
between borrowers and lenders, while in developing countries the financial system is 
much less evolved.  
According to Gurley and Shaw (1955), the economy￿s overall ￿financial capacity￿ is more 
relevant to macroeconomic behaviour than money. Financial capacity is the borrowers￿ 
ability to absorb debt, without having to reduce spending in order to avoid default. 
Financial capacity is an important determinant of aggregate demand, and balance sheets 
(a key determinant of financial capacity) can enhance the movements in spending and 
magnify business cycles. Financial intermediaries are important because they extend 
borrowers￿ financial capacity.  
                                                                 
11   Fisher (1933) calculates that by March 1933, ￿debt as measured in terms of commodities￿, i.e. real debt, had increased by about 
40 percent from its previous peak reached in 1929 (p. 346). 
12   The link between the financial system and economic growth has also been investigated more recently. See, for example, King and 
Levine (1993) and Khan and Senhadji (2000).  
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However, any potential momentum provided by Gurley and Shaw was soon deflected by 
Modigliani and Miller￿s (1958) derivation of the formal proposition that real economic 
decisions are independent of financial structure in the general equilibrium framework of 
Arrow and Debreu. Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that, when capital markets are 
perfectly competitive and information and transactions are costless, the value of a firm 
and its investment decisions are independent of the source of finance, i.e. it is irrelevant 
whether a firm finances its investment decisions through debt or equity.  
The Modigliani-Miller theorem allowed economists to abstract from consideration of credit 
market conditions. In part, credit markets fell by the theoretical wayside because they 
lacked microfoundations, in contrast to the Modigliani-Miller theorem. It was not until the 
1970s with the rise of the economics of imperfect information that foundations began to be 
developed that posit an important role for credit markets (discussed in the next section). 
Until that time, the emphasis was on the role of money in the monetary transmission 
mechanism.  
Keynes￿ (1936) discussion of ￿liquidity preference￿ had shifted the focus to the interaction 
of money supply and money demand as the determinants of the real interest rate. The 
study by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) of the historical relationship between money and 
output became the cornerstone for the monetarist theory, which opposes activist 
government policy intervention aimed at stabilising aggregate demand. ￿Monetarists￿ were 
given their name to reflect the emphasis they place on steady growth in the money supply 
as the basic tenet of stabilisation policy. Friedman and Schwartz￿s (1963) work was an 
alternative explanation of the role of financial markets in the Great Depression, with the 
emphasis on the central importance of money.  
Considerable debate arose over the empirical significance of the mechanism linking 
money and economic activity. One of the earliest empirical studies to try to assess the 
impact of money on economic activity was Friedman and Meiselman (1963). Friedman 
and Meiselman, who tested whether monetary or fiscal policy was more important in the 
determination of nominal income, using single-equation estimation, find a much more 
stable and statistically significant relationship between output and money than between 
output and their measure of government expenditure. Andersen and Jordon (1968) also 
reported a strong empirical relationship between money and nominal income.
13  
One important problem with these single-equation regressions is that they are mis-
specified if money is endogenous, i.e. if the central bank adjusts monetary policy in 
response to shocks to output.
14 To overcome this endogeneity problem, subsequent 
empirical studies of the link between monetary policy and (real) economic activity adopt a 
vector autoregression (VAR) framework, pioneered by Sims￿ (1984) reduced-form 
bivariate model of money and output. The common result, Sims and others find, is that 
lagged values of money can help explain variations in output. This general statistical 
pattern provided the motivation for developing more structural models of movements in 
the money supply and output fluctuations.
15  
Two key assumptions underlay the emphasis on money (and neglect of credit). First, the 
central role of bank deposits (and currency) as transactions media led to the assumption 
that money performs a special service to businesses and consumers not performed by 
other assets, so that other assets are not close substitutes for money. Second, with well-
                                                                 
13   Similar single-equation regressions were estimated to investigate the link between money and real output. 
14   The first study to formally model the idea that a positive correlation between money and output may not indicate the true causal 
role of money was Tobin (1970). 
15   For a summary of the literature see Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996).  
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functioning capital markets, bank credit is simply one alternative source of investment 
finance for businesses. The assumption is that if the supply of bank credit is reduced, 
firms seeking to fund working capital or an investment project can always issue tradable 
bonds or equity shares in the capital market at no extra cost. Given this assumption that 
other sources of finance are perfect substitutes for bank credit, any disturbance to the 
quantity or price of liquidity impacts on the wider economy only through the demand and 
supply of money (see Bernanke, 1992-93; Garretsen and Swank, 1998). From the policy 
makers￿ perspective this meant that attempts to control credit would be negated by 
changes in the supply of substitutes, but attempts to control money would be effective 
given the absence of substitutes. This argument provided the rationale for using monetary 
targets in many countries during the 1970s and 1980s to conduct monetary policy.  
However, with the advent of financial deregulation during the 1980s, the validity of the 
focus on money only and the effectiveness of monetary targets to implement policy were 
called into question. Widespread financial innovation, especially the increased use of 
credit cards and electronic banking, contributed to disrupt what was previously observed 
as a stable medium- to long-run relation between the stock of money and aggregate 
nominal income. The instability between the money stock and nominal income eventually 
led countries to abandon monetary targeting.  
New empirical work and developments in theory (discussed in the next section) rekindled 
interest in the role of credit in the business cycle. The empirical work, beginning with 
Mishkin (1978), involves a reconsideration of an earlier issue ￿ the role of financial factors 
in the Great Depression. Analysing data from the Great Depression to determine whether 
financial factors affected consumer spending, Mishkin finds that the behaviour of 
households￿ net financial positions had a significant influence on consumer demand. 
These results provide evidence that financial market conditions played an important role in 
the business cycle propagation mechanism, reminiscent of the one in Fisher￿s (1933) 
debt-deflation theory. The rise in consumer real indebtedness resulting from declining 
incomes and deflation induced consumers to lower spending on durables and housing, 
which in turn magnified the decline, contributing yet further to the economic downturn.  
Analysing the relative importance of monetary versus financial factors in the Great 
Depression, Bernanke (1983) concludes that the collapse of the financial system was an 
important determinant of the depression￿s depth and persistence. The basic premise in 
Bernanke￿s (1983) analysis is that, because markets for financial claims are incomplete, 
intermediation between borrowers and lenders requires nontrivial market-making and 
information-gathering services. The disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the effectiveness of 
the financial sector in performing these services. As the real costs of intermediation 
increased, some borrowers found credit to be expensive and difficult to obtain. The effects 
of this credit squeeze on aggregate demand contributed to turn the severe but not 
unprecedented downturn of 1929-30 into a protracted depression. The two major 
components of the financial collapse were the loss of confidence in financial institutions, 
primarily commercial banks, and the widespread insolvency of debtors.  
The alternative explanation of the correlation between the conditions of the financial 
sector and the general economy is that due to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who stress 
the effects of the banking crises on the supply of money. To test these two competing 
propositions, Bernanke￿s (1983) empirical approach is to estimate output equations using 
monetary variables, and then to evaluate whether or not adding (non-monetary) proxies 
for the financial crisis improves the performance of these equations. He finds that adding 
proxies for the financial crisis, such as suspended bank deposits, failing business 
liabilities, differentials between BAA corporate bond yields and yields on U.S. government  
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bonds, generally improves the purely monetary explanation of short-run output 
movements.  
4  Current theories of financial intermediation 
Current theories of the economic role of financial intermediaries build on the economics of 
imperfect information that began to emerge during the 1970s with the seminal 
contributions of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). 
Financial intermediaries exist because they can reduce information and transaction costs 
that arise from an information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.
16 Financial 
intermediaries thus assist the efficient functioning of markets, and any factors that affect 
the amount of credit channelled through financial intermediaries can have significant 
macroeconomic effects.  
There are two strands in the literature that formally explain the existence of financial 
intermediaries. The first strand emphasises financial intermediaries￿ provision of liquidity. 
The second strand focuses on financial intermediaries￿ ability to transform the risk 
characteristics of assets. In both cases, financial intermediation can reduce the cost of 
channelling funds between borrowers and lenders, leading to a more efficient allocation of 
resources.  
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analyse the provision of liquidity (the transformation of illiquid 
assets into liquid liabilities) by banks. In Diamond and Dybvig￿s model, ex ante identical 
investors (depositors) are risk averse and uncertain about the timing of their future 
consumption needs. Without an intermediary, all investors are locked into illiquid long-
term investments that yield high payoffs only to those who consume late. Those who must 
consume early receive low payoffs because early consumption requires premature 
liquidation of long-term investments. Banks can improve on a competitive market by 
providing better risk sharing among agents who need to consume at different (random) 
times. An intermediary promising investors a higher payoff for early consumption and a 
lower payoff for late consumption relative to the non-intermediated case enhances risk 
sharing and welfare.  
The optimal insurance contract in Diamond and Dybvig￿s model is a demand deposit 
contract, but it has an undesirable equilibrium (bank run), in which all depositors panic 
and withdraw immediately, including even those who would prefer to leave their deposits 
in the bank if they were not concerned about the bank failing. Bank runs cause real 
economic problems because even ￿healthy￿ banks can fail, leading to a recall of loans and 
the termination of productive investment.  
In Diamond and Dybvig (1983) the illiquidity of assets provides both the rationale for the 
existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs.
17 A bank run is caused by a shift in 
expectations. When normal volumes of withdrawals are known and not stochastic, 
suspension of convertibility of deposits will allow banks both to prevent bank runs and to 
provide optimal risk sharing by converting illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. In the more 
                                                                 
16   When markets do not operate costlessly, firms arise if they can reduce market transaction costs by organising resources more 
cheaply within the firm (Coase, 1937). 
17   The vulnerability to bank runs in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model has stimulated a lengthy debate in the literature on 
prudential regulation. See, for example, Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).  
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general case (with stochastic withdrawals), deposit insurance can rule out runs without 
reducing the ability of banks to transform assets.
18  
Financial intermediaries are able to transform the risk characteristics of assets because 
they can overcome a market failure and resolve an information asymmetry problem. 
Information asymmetry in credit markets arises because borrowers generally know more 
about their investment projects than lenders do. The information asymmetry can occur ￿ex 
ante￿ or ￿ex post￿. An ex ante information asymmetry arises when lenders cannot 
differentiate between borrowers with different credit risks before providing loans and leads 
to an adverse selection problem. Adverse selection problems arise when an increase in 
interest rates leaves a more risky pool of borrowers in the market for funds. Financial 
intermediaries are then more likely to be lending to high-risk borrowers, because those 
who are willing to pay high interest rates will, on average, be worse risks.  
The information asymmetry problem occurs ex post when only borrowers, but not lenders, 
can observe actual returns after project completion. This leads to a moral hazard problem. 
Moral hazard arises when a borrower engages in activities that reduce the likelihood of a 
loan being repaid. An example of moral hazard is when firms￿ owners ￿siphon off￿ funds 
(legally or illegally) to themselves or to associates, for example, through loss-making 
contracts signed with associated firms.  
The problem with imperfect information is that information is a ￿public good￿. If costly 
privately-produced information can subsequently be used at less cost by other agents, 
there will be inadequate motivation to invest in the publicly optimal quantity of information 
(Hirschleifer and Riley, 1979). The implication for financial intermediaries is as follows. 
Once banks obtain information they must be able to signal their information advantage to 
lenders without giving away their information advantage. One reason, financial 
intermediaries can obtain information at a lower cost than individual lenders is that 
financial intermediation avoids duplication of the production of information. Moreover, 
there are increasing returns to scale to financial intermediation. Financial intermediaries 
develop special skills in evaluating prospective borrowers and investment projects. They 
can also exploit cross-sectional (across customers) information and re-use information 
over time.  
Leland and Pyle (1977) formally show that a bank can communicate information to 
investors about potential borrowers at a lower cost than can individual borrowers. They 
focus on an ex ante information asymmetry, where entrepreneurs selling shares to the 
market know the expected returns of their own investment, but other agents find this 
information costly to observe. This results in a moral hazard problem since firms with low 
expected returns have an incentive to claim a high expected return so as to increase their 
market valuation. In Leland and Pyle￿s model intermediaries can solve this moral hazard 
problem by monitoring the actions of firms.  
Retained equity can serve as a costly signal of the entrepreneur￿s information about a 
project.
19 The value of the firm increases with the share of the firm held by the 
                                                                 
18   Under the assumption that banks cannot select the risk of their loan portfolios, a central bank as a lender of last resort could 
provide a service similar to deposit insurance. However, when there is a trade-off between optimal risk and proper incentives for 
portfolio choice, the lender of last resort can no longer be as credible as deposit insurance. If the lender of last resort were always 
required to bail out banks with liquidity problems, there would be perverse incentives for banks to take on risk. Deposit insurance 
on the other hand is a binding commitment that, in theory, can be structured to retain punishment in the case of bank runs. See 
Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Kane (2002) for difficulties in implementing deposit insurance in practice. 
19   Leland and Pyle (1977) assume that investors cannot infer intermediaries￿ information by observing their portfolios.  
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entrepreneur, and in contrast to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the financial structure of a 
firm is therefore related to project or firm value.  
One problem with the Leland and Pyle analysis is that it assumes the existence of an 
incentive signalling equilibrium. However, as Campbell and Kracaw (1980) note, if a 
signalling equilibrium exists, then firms will be properly valued with or without 
intermediaries or other information producers.  
Diamond (1984) argues that diversification within the financial intermediary is the main 
reason financial intermediaries exist. He also develops a model in which the outcome from 
firms￿ investment project is not known ex post to external agents, unless information is 
gathered to assess the outcome, i.e. there is ￿costly state verification￿ (Townsend, 1979). 
This leads to a moral hazard problem because it provides an incentive for borrowers to 
default on a loan even when the project is successful.  
In Diamond￿s model, intermediaries are delegated the costly task of monitoring loan 
contracts. A financial intermediary must choose an incentive contract such that it has 
incentives to monitor the information, make proper use of it, and make sufficient payments 
to depositors to attract deposits. Providing these incentives is costly and diversification 
can reduce these costs.  
The optimal contract is a debt contract (an agreement by the borrower to pay the lender a 
fixed amount) with a non-pecuniary bankruptcy penalty. The intermediary need not be 
monitored because it bears all penalties for any shortfall of payments. This is because the 
diversification of the intermediary￿s portfolio makes the probability of incurring these 
penalties very small. The optimal size for a financial intermediary is infinite; costs are 
lowered indefinitely by diversification, as long as the returns to entrepreneurs are not 
perfectly correlated.
20  
Adverse selection increases the likelihood that loans will be made to bad credit risks, 
while moral hazard lowers the probability that a loan will be repaid. As a result, lenders 
may decide in some circumstances that they would rather not make a loan and credit 
rationing may occur. There are two forms of credit rationing: (i) some loan applicants may 
receive a smaller loan than they applied for at the given interest rate, or (ii) they may not 
receive a loan at all, even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate.  
Jaffee and Russell (1976) develop a theoretical model in which imperfect information and 
uncertainty can lead to rationing in loan markets, where some agents do not receive the 
loan they applied for. Their paper analyses the behaviour of a loan market in which 
borrowers have more information than lenders about the likelihood of default. The key 
feature in the model is the relationship between default proportions and contract sizes. 
There is some minimum loan size at which no default is observed, beyond that, the 
proportion of individuals who do not default is declining with the contract size.  
Since borrowers are identical ex ante, the market interest rate incorporates a premium to 
take account of the aggregate probability of default. Consequently, borrowers with low 
default probability pay a premium to support low quality borrowers and credit rationing in 
the form of the supply of smaller-sized loans than those demanded by the borrowers at a 
quoted rate may result. High quality borrowers will prefer some rationing if the smaller 
loan sizes lower the market average default probabilities, thus reducing the premium.  
                                                                 
20   When project returns are not independently distributed and instead depend on several common factors that are observable (such 
as economic conditions, interest rates, and input prices) the intermediary still monitors firm-specific information, but hedges out all 
systematic risks.  
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develop a model of credit rationing, where some borrowers 
receive loans and others do not. They assume that the interest rate directly affects the 
quality of loans because of an adverse selection effect or moral hazard effect.
21 Banks 
making loans are concerned about the interest rate they receive on a loan, and the 
riskiness of the loan. For a given loan rate, lenders earn a lower expected return on loans 
to borrowers with riskier projects than to good quality borrowers.
22  
The interest rate a bank charges can affect the riskiness of the loans by either sorting 
prospective borrowers (the adverse selection effect), or by affecting the actions of 
borrowers (the moral hazard effect). When the price (interest rate) affects the transaction, 
it may not clear the market. The adverse selection effect of interest rates is a 
consequence of different borrowers having different probabilities of repaying their loans. 
The interest rate an individual is willing to pay may act as a screening device. Those who 
are willing to pay high interest rates may, on average, be worse risks. They are willing to 
borrow at high interest rates because they perceive their probability of repaying the loan to 
be low. As a result there exists an interest rate that maximises the expected return to the 
bank and beyond which the bank will be unwilling to supply funds, making the supply of 
loans curve bend backwards.  
A change in interest rates can affect the bank￿s expected return from loans through the 
moral hazard effect by changing the behaviour of borrowers. Higher interest rates induce 
firms to undertake projects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when 
successful. Increasing the rate of interest increases the relative attractiveness of riskier 
projects, for which the return to the bank may be lower. As the interest rate rises, the 
average riskiness of those who borrow increases and the moral hazard effect reinforces 
the adverse selection problem. Banks therefore have an incentive, in some 
circumstances, to ration credit rather than to raise interest rates when there is excess 
demand for loanable funds.  
Williamson (1986) develops a model of credit rationing where borrowers are subject to a 
moral hazard problem. Borrowers are identical ex ante, but some receive loans and others 
do not. A borrower and lender are asymmetrically informed ex post about the return on the 
borrower￿s investment project, and the borrower will have an incentive to falsely default on 
the loan. Costly monitoring by lenders of borrowers together with large-scale investment 
projects imply that there exist increasing returns to scale in lending and borrowing which 
can be exploited by financial intermediaries. The optimal contract between a lender and a 
borrower is a debt contract and the lender only monitors in the event of default.
23  
An increase in the loan interest rate raises the expected return to the lender, but also 
results in an increase in the probability that the borrower defaults, thus increasing the 
expected cost of monitoring to the lender. This, in turn, generates an asymmetry in the 
borrowers￿ and lenders￿ payoff functions, which can lead to credit rationing. Because of 
the asymmetry in the payoff functions it may not be possible for the loan interest rate to 
adjust to clear the market, so that some borrowers do not receive a loan in equilibrium.  
In summary, financial intermediaries play an important role in credit markets because they 
reduce the cost of channelling funds between relatively uninformed depositors to uses that 
                                                                 
21   Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume that heterogeneity among entrepreneurs arises from different probability distributions of returns 
to their projects. 
22   This occurs because an unobserved mean-preserving spread in a borrower￿s project return distribution reduces the expected 
payment to lenders under default (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). 
23   Unlike in Diamond (1984) monitoring decisions are made ex post and the probability that monitoring occurs is determined 
endogenously.  
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are information-intensive and difficult to evaluate, leading to a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Intermediaries specialise in collecting information, evaluating projects, 
monitoring borrowers￿ performance and risk sharing. Despite this specialisation, the 
existence of financial intermediaries does not replicate the credit market outcomes that 
would occur under a full information environment. The existence of imperfect, 
asymmetrically-held information causes frictions in the credit market. Changes to the 
information structure and to variables which may be used to overcome credit frictions 
(such as firm collateral and equity) will in turn cause the nature and degree of credit 
imperfections to alter. 
Banks and other intermediaries are ￿special￿ where they provide credit to borrowers on 
terms which those borrowers would not otherwise be able to obtain. Because of the 
existence of economies of scale in loan markets, small firms in particular may have 
difficulties obtaining funding from non-bank sources and so are more reliant on bank 
lending than are other firms. Adverse shocks to the information structure, or to these firms￿ 
collateral or equity levels, or to banks￿ ability to lend, may all impact on firms￿ access to 
credit and hence to investment and output.  
5  The credit channel 
The credit channel literature examines the impact of asymmetric information and other 
credit market frictions on real spending and economic activity, with resulting implications 
for monetary policy.
24 The bank lending channel analyses the impact of monetary policy 
on the supply of loans by depository institutions, and the balance sheet (or financial 
accelerator) effect focuses on the potential impact of monetary policy on firms￿ balance 
sheets and their ability to borrow. The credit channel also operates when shifts in 
monetary policy alter either the efficiency of financial markets in matching borrowers and 
lenders or the extent to which borrowers face rationing in credit markets. With credit 
rationing, monetary policy may have real effects without changing interest rates in lending 
markets.  
Monetary policy can have an impact on the supply of intermediated credit, which in most 
countries is predominantly provided by banks. A bank is a financial intermediary that 
participates in the payment system and finances entities in financial deficit, generally the 
public sector, firms and some households, using the funds of entities in financial surplus, 
typically households.  
The reliance on bank credit is probably declining overall as corporations and, in particular, 
large businesses turn to the securities markets to meet their funding needs. However, an 
important fraction of firms, mainly small firms, are likely to remain bank-dependent at least 
in the near future (Trautwein, 2000). Moreover, banks are a critical source of liquidity even 
for large firms during times of economic stress (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).  
The asset side of banks￿ balance sheets consists of loans to the public sector, firms and 
households. The liability side includes deposits by households and firms plus banks￿ 
equity. Banks￿ equity consists of stock issues and retained earnings. Banks typically 
￿borrow short￿ and ￿lend long￿: they take deposits that can be withdrawn on demand or in 
a matter of months and make loans that often are only re-paid over periods of years. As a 
result, banks￿ assets tend to have longer maturity than their liabilities. Monetary policy can 
have an impact on banks￿ balance sheets because of this maturity mismatch of assets 
                                                                 
24   See Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Mishkin (1995) and Trautwein (2000) among others.  
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and liabilities. In the absence of perfect interest rate hedging, a tightening in monetary 
policy, i.e. an increase in interest rates, tends to cause a larger decline in the present 
value of the assets with longer maturity than the liabilities with shorter maturity. 
Conversely, a decline in interest rates causes a larger gain in the present value of the 
assets than the liabilities. For example, the decline in the market price of a unit future 
cash flow (see equation 2) due to an increase in  t i  is a function of  t k , the number of years 
to maturity  
exp( )
,+ ∂








  (3) 
By construction, because the asset side of a balance sheet equals the liability side, a 
tightening in monetary policy that leads to a larger decline in the value of loans than the 
value of deposits, implies a contraction in banks￿ value of equity. If banks are required by 
regulators or depositors to retain some minimum capital ratio (defined as the value of 
banks￿ equity as a percent of the value of loans outstanding), they will have to either 
reduce their supply of loanable funds or raise new equity. However, because equity takes 
time to raise and also because the cost of new capital has increased due to higher 
interest rates and a lower market value of banks, the typical initial response is a 
contraction in lending.
25  
A reduction in the supply of bank loans increases the financing cost, or reduces the 
financing, of firms that are dependent on banks for credit. Bank-dependent firms are 
typically smaller in size (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). These firms tend to be bank-
dependent because their access to (non-bank) capital markets is poor, because of 
reduced economies of scale with respect to intermediaries acquiring information about 
small firms. Moreover, the spread between the interest rate on loans paid by bank-
dependent (small) firms and the interest rate paid by (large) firms, who use public debt 
markets, tends to increase during monetary contractions (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 
1993).  
A reduction in the supply of bank credit reduces real activity. During the Asian crisis in the 
second half of the 1990s, for example, the disruption in the supply of credit was a major 
factor in the recessions experienced by the affected countries. Banks in these countries 
were unable or unwilling to establish credit facilities required for importers to provide 
overseas suppliers assurance of payment. The duration of a credit squeeze depends on 
how long it takes to establish new or revive old channels of credit after a disruption. In 
Asia it lasted several months in some countries and over two years in the case of 
Indonesia (Grimes, 1998).  
The bank lending channel is likely to be more important in small open economies than 
large closed countries. This is because the proportion of small, typically bank-dependent, 
firms tends to be higher than in larger economies. Financial innovations and deregulation 
are unlikely to have materially improved bank-dependent firms￿ ability to borrow from the 
capital markets. In the presence of open capital markets the information problem is 
augmented by additional informational asymmetries between foreign and domestic 
borrowers and lenders. Foreign investors may be less willing to lend to small firms than 
domestic lenders.  
If banks are special in providing credit to a large fraction of firms in the economy, the 
amount of credit channelled through the banking system may have significant 
                                                                 
25   Sofianos, Wachtel and Melnik (1990) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) provide empirical evidence of the response of bank loans 
to fluctuations in interest rates.  
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macroeconomic effects. Most macroeconomic models currently used by policy makers do 
not explicitly incorporate a banking sector and hence do not capture these bank lending 
effects of the monetary transmission mechanism.  
Information asymmetries and the inability of lenders to monitor borrowers costlessly lead 
to ￿agency costs￿, which create a wedge between the costs of internal and external 
financing for a firm (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Cash flow and net worth are important 
determinants of agency costs and hence the cost and availability of finance, and ultimately 
the level of investment (Walsh, 1998). For instance, a firm with high net worth (equity) 
thereby signals its credit-worthiness to banks which can in turn lend to the firm without 
having to incur the same expected monitoring costs, so lowering the cost of borrowing for 
the firm. If net worth is depleted, the result is a rise in the firm￿s borrowing costs. 
The second channel, the balance sheet or financial accelerator effect, focuses on the 
potential impact of monetary policy on firms￿ financial positions and arises from the 
presence of agency costs. Agency costs in credit markets occur whenever lenders 
delegate control over resources to borrowers, leading to adverse selection, moral hazard 
and monitoring costs because of the inability to monitor borrowers or share in borrowers￿ 
information costlessly.  
As discussed in section 2, a tightening in monetary policy that raises real interest rates 
reduces the profitability of firms￿ investment projects because of higher financing costs 
(and indirectly because of the prospect of a slowdown in consumption).
26 Higher interest 
expenses lower firms￿ cash flow and internal funds, and could increase firms￿ short-term 
borrowing (and interest expenses) if firms need to borrow to finance an inventory build-up 
as a result of slowing demand. Interest expenses may thus remain high for some time 
even after short-term interest rates have started coming down because of the rise in short-
term debt outstanding.  
The effects of a corporate cash squeeze on real activity depend largely on firms￿ ability to 
smooth the decline in cash flows by borrowing. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find that larger 
firms, which are more likely to have recourse to commercial paper markets and other 
sources of short-term credit, typically respond to an unanticipated decline in cash flows by 
increasing their short-term borrowing. These firms are, at least temporarily, able to 
maintain their level of production and employment during periods of rising interest rate 
costs and declining revenues. As a result, inventories of large firms tend to grow following 
a tightening of monetary policy. In contrast, small firms, which in most cases have more 
limited access to short-term credit, respond to the cash squeeze by decumulating 
inventories and cutting work hours and production.  
In the presence of agency costs, the effects of a monetary tightening will be amplified 
further via the balance sheet or financial accelerator effect. This is because the 
deterioration in firms￿ balance sheets due to lower cash flow and internal funds worsens 
the agency problem and so increases the costs of external financing. Adding to the higher 
cost of external financing is the fact that higher interest rates lower the market value (or 
net worth) of firms and hence lower the value of assets that firms can use as collateral. As 
a result, banks may be less willing to lend to firms because the reduction in collateral 
increases banks￿ potential losses from adverse selection: owners will have a lower equity 
stake in their firms, which gives them more incentive to engage in risky investment 
                                                                 
26   The rise in borrowers￿ interest expenses is, of course, only a redistribution from borrowers to lenders. However, a redistribution 
between borrowers and lenders is not neutral if, for example, lenders and borrowers do not have access to the same investment 
and spending opportunities.  
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projects. In some cases, the decline in collateral may lead to loans not being extended 
upon maturity or even being recalled, i.e. forms of credit rationing.  
A tightening in monetary policy that increases the external financing premium (or wedge 
between the costs of internal and external funding) will have additional contractionary 
effects on investment, output and spending. Higher interest rates may have a much 
stronger contractionary impact on the economy if balance sheets are already weak, 
introducing the possibility that non-linearities in the impact of monetary policy may be 
important.
27  
6  General equilibrium models of the credit 
channel 
Financial intermediaries exist because of imperfect information between borrowers and 
lenders. Modelling asymmetric information is difficult and probably the main reason why 
macroeconomic models currently used by policy makers do not incorporate a fully 
developed credit channel.  
Credit channel effects are not completely ignored by these models, but tend to be 
incorporated in an ad hoc manner as borrowing or cash flow constraints. For instance, in 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors￿ FRB/US model constraints are imposed to try to 
mimic the behaviour of credit-constrained households and firms. Additionally, the 
investment equation in the FRB/US model is augmented with cash flow influences 
(Brayton and Tinsley, 1996). Credit constraints are also a feature of the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand￿s macroeconomic model to some degree. In this model, the stock of 
household assets and the future path of labour income determine the sustainable, long-
run flow of consumption. Some consumers, however, consume all their current period 
income and do not accumulate assets. This can be interpreted as a credit constraint 
where some individuals do not have access to credit markets and hence are unable to 
smooth consumption by borrowing against their future labour income (see Black, Cassino, 
Drew, Hansen, Hunt, Rose and Scott, 1997; Claus and Smith, 1999).  
Dynamic general equilibrium models that formally account for an explicit role of credit 
market frictions in business cycle fluctuations have begun to be developed in the 
literature. In these models, monetary policy can have a significant impact on the real 
economy because of asymmetric information and agency costs. None of the models is 
complete. In particular, elements that are important in an open economy are still not being 
captured. Moreover, these models often do not explicitly account for the bank lending 
channel. Typically these models incorporate a financial accelerator mechanism.  
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that 
incorporates a financial accelerator. The key mechanism in this model is the link between 
an external finance premium and the net worth of prospective borrowers. The external 
finance premium is the difference between the cost of funds raised externally and the 
                                                                 
27   Credit market frictions that affect firms should also be relevant to the borrowing and spending decisions made by households, 
particularly spending on costly durable items such as automobiles and houses. In Carroll￿s (1997) buffer stock model of 
consumption, for example, balance sheet effects impact on consumers￿ willingness to spend. If consumers expect a higher 
likelihood of finding themselves in financial distress, they would rather be holding fewer illiquid assets like consumer durables or 
housing and more liquid financial assets. As discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), this channel is still comparatively under-
developed in the literature.  
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opportunity costs of internal funds. An increase in entrepreneurs￿ wealth or net worth 
lowers the external finance premium. A decline in net worth raises it.  
The basic structure of the model is as follows. There are three agents in the economy: 
households, entrepreneurs, and retailers. Households work, consume, and save. 
Entrepreneurs produce output by hiring labour and using capital, which they purchased in 
the previous period. Acquisitions of capital are financed out of entrepreneurs￿ net worth 
and by borrowing. Entrepreneurs￿ net worth arises from two sources: profits accumulated 
from previous capital investment and entrepreneurs￿ income from supplying labour. 
Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods in competitive markets, and sell their output to 
retailers who are monopolistic competitors. Retailers buy goods from entrepreneurs, 
differentiate them (costlessly) and then re-sell these goods to households. The monopoly 
power of retailers allows modelling nominal rigidities in the economy; otherwise, retailers 
play no role.  
Entrepreneurs￿ net worth is an important determinant of their cost of external finance. An 
increase in net worth lowers the external finance premium of entrepreneurs leading to 
increased borrowing, and thus higher investment, spending and production. A decline in 
net worth has the opposite effects. The main source of variation in net worth is 
entrepreneurs￿ equity, which in turn is sensitive to unexpected shifts in asset prices and 
unanticipated changes in the ex post return to capital.  
The financial accelerator magnifies the impact of monetary policy on the real economy 
and smaller countercyclical movements in interest rates are therefore required to dampen 
output movements. The greater the extent to which monetary policy is able to stabilise 
output, the smaller is the effect of the financial accelerator in amplifying and propagating 
business cycle fluctuations.  
Calibrated for the United States, the model is able to replicate observed cyclical 
movements in macroeconomic variables when allowing for price stickiness, decision lags 
in investment and limited access to credit for some entrepreneurs. Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999) do not incorporate credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), where some borrowers simply do not receive loans, but assume that the price of 
capital can differ across entrepreneurs.  
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a model with Stiglitz and Weiss type credit constraints. 
Credit constraints arise because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts 
unless the debts are secured. Assets such as land, buildings and machinery serve as 
collateral for loans and borrowers￿ credit limits are affected by the value of collateralised 
assets. The basic structure of their model is as follows. There are two goods, a durable 
asset (land) and a nondurable commodity (fruit) and two types of agent: farmers and 
gatherers. Both farmers and gatherers produce and eat fruit. In each period, land is 
exchanged for fruit at a given price, and fruit is exchanged for a claim to some fruit in the 
next period.  
Farmers￿ technology is idiosyncratic in the sense that, once their production has started at 
date t  with some land, then only they possess the skill necessary to cultivate the land to 
bear fruit at date  1 + t . Moreover, it is assumed that farmers can always withdraw their 
labour. This implies that if farmers have a lot of debt, they may try to threaten their 
creditors by withdrawing their labour and repudiating their debt contract. Lenders protect 
themselves from the threat of repudiation by collateralising farmers￿ land; that is, farmers 
must make a down payment in order to purchase land. At date t  farmers can borrow up to  
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an amount at which the repayment does not exceed the (expected) market value of their 
land at date  1 + t .  
Gatherers￿ production does not require any specific skills and gatherers, unlike farmers, 
are not credit constrained. Because gatherers are not credit constrained their demand for 
land is determined where the present value of the marginal product of land equals the 
opportunity cost of holding land. The amount of land is fixed, so if farmers￿ demand for 
land increases, then in order for the land market to clear, gatherers￿ demand has to 
decline.  
The dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices is an important 
transmission mechanism by which the effects of shocks persist, amplify and propagate 
business cycle fluctuations. For example, a temporary productivity shock that reduces the 
net worth of credit constrained farmers forces farmers to cut back their demand for land. 
For the land market to clear, the demand for land by the gatherers has to increase, which 
requires that their opportunity costs of holding land must fall. The land price drops by the 
same amount as the opportunity costs of holding land, which lowers the value of farmers￿ 
existing landholdings, and reduces their net worth still further. Small temporary 
productivity shocks thereby generate large and persistent fluctuations in output and asset 
prices. The fluctuations in output become even more persistent when capital (trees) is 
reproducible, i.e. investment is introduced, and when in each period only a fraction of the 
farmers are able to invest.  
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) develop a general equilibrium model that explicitly 
incorporates financial intermediaries. There are three agents in this model: entrepreneurs, 
consumers and financial intermediaries (capital mutual funds). Entrepreneurs receive 
external financing from households through the capital mutual funds. The creation of new 
capital (including entrepreneurial capital) is subject to agency costs, which in turn are a 
function of entrepreneurs￿ net worth. An increase in net worth lowers agency costs and 
thus lowers the cost of new capital. A decline in net worth increases agency costs and the 
cost of capital.  
Calibrated for the United States, the model is able to replicate observed movements in 
output. Following a temporary positive productivity shock, for example, output rises 
gradually. This is because the shock causes households to delay their investment 
decisions until agency costs are at their lowest level ￿ several periods after the initial 
shock. Agency costs fall over time because the shock increases the return to internal 
funds and net worth.
28  
Carlstrom and Fuerst show how agency costs arising from the difference between the 
costs of external and internal funds can alter business cycle dynamics following a supply-
side shock. However, the model abstracts from demand-side shocks and does not 
explicitly model a monetary authority.  
Edwards and VØgh (1997) develop a theoretical model of a small open economy with 
privately-owned banks that allows for monetary policy shocks. They have four agents in 
the economy: households, entrepreneurs, banks and a government/monetary authority. 
Households are subject to a deposit-in-advance constraint and must use demand deposits 
to purchase consumption. Entrepreneurs produce output by hiring labour from 
households. They face a credit-in-advance constraint and must borrow from banks to pay 
households￿ wages. Banks lend to entrepreneurs and hold households￿ demand deposits. 
                                                                 
28   Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) assume that entrepreneurs are long-lived. In Fuerst (1995) entrepreneurs only live for a single period 
and the model is unable to replicate the positive serial correlation observed in output.  
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Banks finance their lending to entrepreneurs through deposits and borrowing 
internationally. Banks￿ operations are costly, which introduces a wedge between the 
lending rate and the deposit rate, the interest spread. Changes in the interest spread and 
bank credit, resulting from shocks to the banking system and world business cycle, lead to 
fluctuations in output and employment.  
Edwards and VØgh (1997) explicitly model financial intermediaries and allow for a foreign 
sector. However, the theoretical model, which is not empirically tested, only incorporates 
the bank lending channel, although it appears that the bank lending channel by itself 
cannot explain the macroeconomic fluctuations that are observed following a monetary 
policy shock (Fisher, 1999). Moreover, the economy in the model does not operate under 
a flexible exchange rate and so does not provide information on interactions between 
financial intermediaries’ actions and the exchange rate channel.  
The models discussed in this section are important contributions to understanding the 
effects of imperfect information in credit markets. But each is incomplete and further work 
is needed. General equilibrium models of the credit channel, where agents￿ decisions are 
derived from optimising behaviour, have mainly focused on the closed economy. The 
credit channel has yet to be incorporated in a model of an open economy with a floating 
exchange rate. Moreover, models to date generally only allow for either the bank lending 
channel or the balance sheet channel, but not both.  
7  Summary and conclusions 
Macroeconomic models currently used by policy makers generally assume that the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds. The theorem implies that, under the 
assumptions of complete markets and the absence of information and transaction costs, 
the workings of financial markets can be fully summarised by financial prices and allows 
one to abstract from considerations of credit market conditions. However, imperfect 
information and theories of financial intermediation suggest that information and 
transactions costs are important and the assumptions upon which the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem is based, and thus macroeconomic models used by policy makers, do not hold in 
practice. These models hence disregard the importance of credit markets and financial 
intermediaries not only for individual depositors but the economy as a whole.  
Financial intermediaries play an important role because they reduce the cost of 
channelling funds between relatively uninformed depositors to uses that are information-
intensive and difficult to evaluate. If banks and other intermediaries provide credit to a 
large fraction of firms, who otherwise would not be able to borrow, the amount of credit 
channelled through the banking system can have significant macroeconomic effects, 
highlighting the importance of public policy in designing policies that ensure the 
soundness of the banking system.  
These policies may include deposit insurance, a lender of last resort function and 
prudential regulation, including imposition of a minimum capital ratio. However, such 
policies may themselves contribute to the impact of the credit channel. For instance, 
consider a bank that is required by regulation to hold at least a 4 percent tier 1 equity to 
risk-adjusted assets ratio (as under the Basle regime) and which initially has a 5 percent 
equity ratio. The bank then experiences a shock to its capital base as a result of a 
negative economic shock that reduces its equity ratio to 3 percent. If it cannot access new 
equity immediately, it has no choice but to reduce the size of its loan portfolio by a 
combination of extending fewer new loans, reducing loan rollovers and calling in existing  
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(callable) loans. The initial negative economic shock thereby is magnified as the credit 
supply is diminshed. By contrast, without the 4 percent minimum, the bank may be able to 
undertake less drastic short-term adjustment. In some circumstances, therefore, there 
may be a trade-off between soundness (minimum capital) and monetary policy (credit 
channel) concerns. Nevertheless, policies which promote bank soundness ￿ for instance, 
through a requirement for directors￿ attestations regarding adequacy of risk management 
systems ￿ in general, reduce the potential for shocks to impact on bank capital in the first 
place, so helping to mitigate both soundness concerns and credit market imperfections.  
The credit channel literature has made great strides in recent years, but significant issues 
remain unresolved. Much of the literature to date has focused on the United States, which 
can be adequately modelled as a large closed economy. The credit channel has yet to be 
incorporated in a model of a small open economy with a floating exchange rate. Moreover, 
existing models generally only allow for either the bank lending channel or the balance 
sheet channel, but not both. To account for the bank lending channel, a model would 
need to explicitly incorporate financial intermediaries and bank lending, while balance 
sheet or financial accelerator effects could be captured by making firms￿ acquisitions of 
capital depend on their net worth. The foreign sector could be accounted for by allowing at 
least some agents in the model to borrow from abroad. The development of such a model 
based on an amalgam of recent advances of the literature presents an agenda for a 
programme of future work. This programme, by incorporating financial market interactions 
into macroeconomic models, will enhance the understanding of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and other shocks to the economy.   
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